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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  One of the (largely) consequences of the contemporary phase of globalization
1 
is that it is compelling academic scholars, national governments and supranational 
entities to reappraise the nature and purposes of development;  and the ways in which 
the  activities  of  multinational  enterprises  (MNEs)
2  are  both  responding  to,  and 
influencing, it. 
  In this paper, we shall first summarise the main ingredients of what we shall 
term the new paradigm of development (NPD) – and how these differ in substance or 
emphasis with those which were generally accepted in the 1970s and 1980s.  In doing 
so,  we  shall  draw  particularly  on  the  recent  writings  of  three  Nobel Laureates  in 
Economics – Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz and Douglass North;  and set these in the 
context of the attitudes and actions of the participants in the international economy in 
response to 20/21 globalization.  We shall then offer our own interpretation of an 
NPD;  and in doing so will give particular attention to (what in our judgement is) one 
of  its  most  important,  yet  least  considered  components,  viz  its  institutional 
composition. 
  The final part of the paper will examine some of the implications of the NPD 
for  our  theorising  about  both  the  determinants  of  MNE  activity  in  developing 
countries;  and about its likely impact on our economic and social well being. 
 
                                                
1 We use the threshold definition of MNEs (sometimes referred to a transnational corporations (TNCs) 
to embrace all enterprises which engage in foreign direct investment and which own or control value 
added activity outside their national boundaries. 
2 Henceforth called 20/21 globalization to distinguish it from the previous great leap forward in the 
internationalisation of world commerce viz the 19
th century.   2 
2.  THE STATE OF DEVELOPMENT THINKING CIRCA 1970s 
  Table 1 summarises the purposes, nature and determinants of development in 
the 1970s and early 1980s – as contained in the leading scholarly writings of the time, 
and in the attitudes, statements, policies, strategies and other actions taken by the 
main  participants  in  the  development  enhancing  process.    These,  of  course,  are 
generalizations;  and their precise form varied according to country, sector or firm 
specific factors. 
  The key characteristics of the old development paradigm (ODP) as set out by 
scholars  is  based  on  the  underlying  assumption  that,  as  a  group,  the  goals  and 
characteristics  of  the  developing  countries  were  fundamentally  similar  to  those  of 
developed  countries
3  except  the  former  were  less  developed  than  the  latter!  
Furthermore, it was believed that the best way to advance the living standards of the 
poorer countries, usually proxied by gross national product (gnp) per head, was for 
them to adopt the institutions and policies of the wealthier nations – which had helped 
them grow and prosper in the first place. 
  With some notable exceptions – e.g. those of the dependencia and Marxist 
schools of thought,
4 earlier work by economists on development paid little heed to 
social goals or to the production of goods and services which could not be readily 
supplied by the market.  In the developed world at least, most of the literature was an 
extension of the (dominant) neoclassical ……….in which the role of government was 
limited to facilitating market transactions and supplying goods the markets could not 
supply.  Essentially Western economists interested in development sought to apply the 
toolkits  of  received  trade,  productivity  and  growth  theory  to  explain  why  some 
                                                
3 Which, of course, themselves differed according to resource structures, size, degree of international 
economical…. 
4 See e.g. Biersteker (1978), Sunkel (1972), South (1979 in respect of the dependencia school and the 
Marxist approach.  See also several contributions in Moran (1986).   3 
developing countries grew
5 and others did not (Reynolds, 1970).  For the most part 
little  attention  was  given  to  such  goods  as  the  environment,  participation,  safety, 
sovereignty,  identified,  for  example,  by  Jack  Behrman  in  his  writings.  (Behrman 
1971). 
  Although critical – to a greater or lesser extent to the neoclassical approach, 
the influential work of scholars such as W.A.Lewis (1965), Paul Streeten (1974), Bala 
Belansa  (1981)  and  Hollis  Chenery  (1979)  least  critical  –  some  of  which  are 
summarized in Lall (1993), each looked at the plight of developing countries as a lack 
of indigenous capacity  to meet several economic objectives.  For example, in his 
appraisal, Streeten identified eight ‘gaps’ which developing countries needed to fill if 
their policy objectives were to be filled.
6  But neither he, nor other scholars at the 
time, paid little credence to the process by which the gaps might be reduced;  the 
approach was by and large a comparative static and frictionless one;  the means and 
ends of development were largely considered independent of each other;  the issue of 
production of international public goods, such as the environment;  and the role of 
civil society and supranational agencies was largely ignored,– and indeed the whole 
issue of  ownership, and stakeholder capitalism was for the most part ignored. 
  Beyond  (Western  based)  academia,  however,  a  broader  perspective  on 
development issues was being taken.  Nowhere was this more demonstrated than in 
the UN where the whole issue of the sovereignty and participation of the developing 
countries  in  the  emerging  world  economy  was  actively  discussed.    In  the  1970s 
pronouncements  such  as  the  Charter  on  Human  Rights,  the  New  International 
                                                
5  
6 These included a resource gap (between desired investment and locally mobilised savings) a foreign 
exchange or trade gap between foreign exchange requirements and foreign exchange earnings plus 
official aid, a budgetary gap between target revenue and locally raised taxes, a management and skill 
gap between the supply of and demand for these capacities, a technology gap, an entrepreneurship gap, 
an (international) marketing gap, an employment gap and a market structure (improvement) gap.   4 
Economic Order and the Permanent Sovereignty over National Resources, together 
with  the  report  of  a  Group  of  Eminent  Persons  on  the  Role  of  Multinational 
Corporations on Economic Development and (sic) International relations (UN 1974) 
became  the  basis  for  identifying  the  major  goals  and  tasks  of  development  –  as 
viewed primarily by many (but not all) developing countries.
7  However, the case for 
a more holistic approach to development which also recognised the desire for political 
sovereignty and autonomy in economic decision taking by national governments was 
very context specific, it being most vociferously voiced by Latin American countries 
and least by the emerging and rapidly growing East Asian economies.
8 
  For the most part, these views and actions had little impact on mainstream 
scholarly  thinking.    Neither  did  they  greatly  influence  the  views  or  strategies  of 
business enterprises, which, at this time, (with a few exceptions) thought it was the 
task of governments to deal with the social issues of development – including those 
related to governance of social justice.  Moreover, such enterprises were very much 
driven  to  meet  their  shareholders  interests,  which  in  the  main  were  of  a  profit 
maximising, capital appreciation kind.  Civil society – in the guise of special interest 
groups – including consumer and ethical shareholders activism;  generally ineffective 
apart  from  particular  issues  like  Apartheid,  natural  disasters  and  occasional 
unacceptable practices of MNEs, (e.g. the ITT affair in Chile and the Nestle milk 
powder scandal).
9 
                                                
7 In addition, several UN agencies (e.g. UNCTAD, ILO, UNIDO) also took a broad perspective on 
development.  By contrast the World Bank, IMF and GATT took a more narrow economic efficiency 
enhancing approach. 
8 The former who were most influenced by the ‘dependencia’ group of scholars;  and the latter by a 
Western based neoclassical approach modified to include the role of the State as an enabling and 
participatory form of governance. 
9 These and other early malpractices on the part of MNEs are described by Tagi Sagafi-Nejad in his 
history of the interaction between the UN and TNC, (see Sagafi Negad (2003).   5 
  One reason for this was that the awareness factor and the radius of concern – 
especially among developed country participants – was itself not as well developed.  
However,  some  well  established  philanthropic  organizations  and  religious  groups 
continued to emphasize the needs of the poorest inhabitants of developing countries, 
as indeed did trade unions in respect of the rights of third world workers. 
  In short, as far as the contents of ODP which largely dominated mainstream 
thinking  tended  to  pursue  a  narrow  somewhat  ethnocentric,  unifaceted  and  static 
economic approach.   In particular, it paid relatively little attention to institutional 
infrastructure and social capital, the paucity of which frequently frustrated the ability 
of  decision  takers  in  the  developing  world  to  create  and  effectively  deploy  the 
resources and capabilities necessary for their development. 
 
3.  GLOBALIZATION  AND  TECHNOLOGICAL  ADVANCE;    THE 
  OPENING FOR A NEW PARADIGM  
 
  In the two decades following the arrival of the Thatcher government in the UK 
and  the  Reagan  administration  in  the  US,  the  global  economic  scenario  and  its 
implications  for  thinking  on  the  purposes  and  characteristics  of  development  has 
changed dramatically. 
  Most of the events of these years are well known and have been described at 
length elsewhere.  In Table 2 we summarise these as they affect the subject of this 
paper.  It can be seen that the twin driving forces necessitating a reappraisal of both 
scholarly  thinking  about  and  practical  action  towards  development  are  (1)  the 
liberalisation of markets  and technological advances  in cross border transport and 
communication.  Between them these have led both to an enlargement of economic 
opportunities of firms, social intercourse between people of different cultures, and a 
huge  reduction  in  cross-border  transaction  costs.    (2)  Advances  in  all  forms  of   6 
information and knowledge relating to the wealth creating process.  Such information 
and  knowledge  is  contained  in  both  physical  capital  and  human  capability.    It 
embraces  all  stages  of  a  given  value  chain  and  across  value  chains.    It  also 
incorporates both micro and macro organizational capital. 
  When the nature of these two forces are considered together it can be seen that 
they……………the forces of globalization are in order to promote production and 
exchange most effectively.  In particular, it is frequently necessary for firms to work 
together  to  create  and  exploit  some  kinds  of  innovations.    In  other  cases  a  firm 
producing end goods in one country may need to draw upon the expertise of a firm in 
another country to either provide it with an essential input, or help it market and 
distribute its product(s).  To be effective such horizontal and vertical coalitions need 
each  participant  to  bring  to  the  table  assets  over  and  above  those  needed  in  a 
hierarchical organization.  In particular research has shown that the virtues of trust, 
honesty,  reciprocity  and  a  respect  for  cultural  et  al  traditions,  are  particularly 
important requirements determining the success of strategic alliances and other forms 
of non-equity partnerships.
10 
  Yet, perhaps the most significant consequence of globalization, which directly 
stems from those just identified, is that to do with its institutional imperatives and 
particularly the behaviour of its participants.  Our assertions here are two-fold.  The 
first is that one of the unique features of globalization is that in various ways it links – 
it  interconnects  –  different  behavioural  mores  and  value  systems,  which  though, 
prima facie at least, are not easily reconcilable with each other, (or at such differences 
need to be respected) need to be if international commerce is to be conducted in a 
peaceful and fruitful way.  Globalization has in fact widened and changed the physical 
                                                
10 For examples see various contributions in Contractor and Lorange (2002).   7 
and human environment for doing business.  The number of developing countries’ 
players  on  the  world  economic  stage  is  increasing  all  the  time.    Technological 
advances have made it more volatile, complex and challenging.  TV and the internet 
have increased the awareness (not to mention the expectations) among the peoples of 
the world about their respective values, needs and aspirations;  it has facilitated the 
cross  border  exchange  of  knowledge,  ideas  and  information.    It  has  widened  the 
radius  and  generated  new  forms  of  interpersonal,  intercorporate  cooperation.    By 
doing so it is compelling a reconfiguration of the purposes of development;  it is 
reprioritising objectives and questioning the means by which poverty and the other 
downsides associated with contemporary global capitalism might be resolved. 
  The second of our two assertions is that incentive structures and the belief 
systems underpinning them tend to lag behind technical, economic and even political 
change.  Yet it is not too much to say that each age of capitalism depends on a moral 
culture which nurtures the virtues and values on which its existence depends.  It is the 
implicit contention of this paper that not only is 20/21 globalization requiring a new 
understanding of the purposes, nature and determinants of development, but that if it 
is to be economically sustainable, democratically inclusive and socially acceptable, its 
institutional  infrastructure  needs  to  be  reconfigured  and  upgraded.    Many  of  the 
changes required are in the process of being put in place;  others are still necessary.  It 
is the implications of these for the determinants of MNE activity to which we shall 
give attention in the latter part of this paper. 
 
4.  THE NDP – VIEWS OF THE TRIO OF NOBEL LAUREATES 
  We now turn to consider some of the ingredients of the NPD seen primarily 
through  the  lens  of  three  Nobel  Laureates,  Armartya  Sen,  Joseph  Stiglitz  and   8 
Douglass North.  Though,as Figures 1 and Table 3 show, each economist takes a 
somewhat different perspective, each is dissatisfied with the ODP – and particularly 
that which reflects the principles of the Washington Consensus, and views gnp per 
head as the main indicator of development;  each thinks of development as a holistic 
and multi-faceted concept embracing a variety of objectives;  to a greater or  lesser 
extent,  each  is  concerned  with  the  dynamics  of  the  transformation  and  each 
emphasises the importance of institutions and each regards means and ends as being 
interwoven as part of the development process. 
  Looking at the specific contributions of the Laureates that of Amartya Sen is 
to give most focus to the ways of advancing real freedom of people, both by removing 
the main sources of ‘unfreedom’, e.g. poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities, 
neglect of public facilities and the intolerance and over activity of repressive states 
and to promote the more positive freedoms of choice and opportunity (Sen 1999).  In 
the pursuance of these goals, Sen also views substantive freedom as a means, as well 
as an end of development.  In identifying five types of freedom
11 Sen pays special 
attention to the institutions necessary to help people to better value and control their 
lives, to advance their true capabilities and responsibilities, and to achieve a desirable 
balance between the role of the different constituents of the wealth creating process.  
Sen, of course, recognises the huge difficulties in measuring the kind of development 
he urges, but suggests a start should be made by better incorporating freedom related 
indices into any index of progress.
12 
                                                
11 Sen identifies five kinds of freedom, viz political freedom, economic freedom, social freedom, 
transparency guarantees and protective security.  Each may be viewed as a freedom from something 
undesired or a freedom to achieve certain objectives. 
12 Such as, e.g. extent and rate of poverty reduction, reduction in abuses of human rights, mortality 
reduction, promotion of democracy , protection of the environment, reduction in corporate and 
government malfeasance, advances in security and safety standards.  It should be acknowledged that 
some indices, e.g. the UN Human Poverty Index, and the Heritage Index of Freedom have already 
made some progress in this direction.   9 
  To Joseph Stiglitz, development is primarily concerned with the economic and 
structural transformation of resources, capabilities of societies and markets;  and of 
the mindsets and entrepreneurship of its individual and organizational constituents.  
Stiglitz’s main criticism of the ODP (as we have identified it) is that it is too narrowly 
focused,  is  incapable  of  coping  with  the  needs  of  an  uncertain  innovating  global 
economy,  tends  to  be  adversarial  in  its  approach,  ignores  the  ownership  and/or 
participatory issue , underestimates the role of the non-market sector in the provision 
of  collective  goods  or  those  which  generate  spillover  effects,  and  perhaps  most 
important, pays little or no heed to the institutional infrastructure, the quality of which 
he asserts is one of the critical determinants to the direction, structure and speed of the 
transformation process. 
  Stiglitz believes  that the NPD should be (and  to a certain  extent is) more 
holistic, more consensual, more socially inclusive, more open, more participatory in 
its content.  It should better recognise the role of partnerships, networks and social 
capital  as  contributors  to  these  goals.    It  should    place  the  learning  process  and 
adjustment of individuals and organizations’ efficiency centre stage.  It should pay 
more attention to the role of civil society and special interest groups as developing 
enhancing entities.  It should necessitate a wholesale reconfiguration of the objectives 
and functions of the leading supranational organization especially the UN, the World 
Bank, the IMF and the WTO.
13 
  Of the three Nobel Laureates, Douglass North is the one who pays the most 
attention to the incentive structures affecting economic development.  Such incentive 
structures in his various publications
14 have been all too frequently ignored in the neo-
classical  literature.    But  North,  like  Sen  and  Stiglitz,  believes  the  contemporary 
                                                
13 As spelled out in more detail in Stiglitz (2002). 
14 Notably North (1990, 1994, 1999).   10 
characteristics  of  the  global  economy,  and  reconfiguration  of  views  by  both 
individuals  and  organizations  about  the  purpose  and  content  of  development,  in 
compelling academic scholars, the business community and governments to pay more 
attention  to  the  rules  of  the  game  and  enforcement  mechanisms  undergirding 
economic activity.
15 
  Much of North’s work in recent years has been to identify the components of 
the incentive structure of different societies, and of the individuals and organizations 
comprising them.  More specifically he defines institutions as the rules of the game 
which  govern the way  in which  humans structure  their (commercial) interactions.  
They comprise first formal rules such as constitutions, laws and regulations, which are 
normally  put  in  place  and  enforced  by  political  entities,  e.g.  governments  or 
supranational  agencies;    second  informal  rules  such  as  norms  of  behaviour, 
conventions, covenants and voluntary codes of conduct that govern much of human 
behavior, which may be either imposed on a lower level of governance by a higher 
level of governance, or spontaneously (voluntarily) imposed;  a third enforcement 
mechanism made up of (a) self enforced codes of ethics or behavior, (b) the ability of 
those (adversely) affected to retaliate, (c) penalties or sanctions (sticks) or tax et al 
incentives (carrots) imposed by governments. 
  According  to  North,  as  a  society  develops  and  economies  become  more 
complex and specialised, so do the transaction costs of economic activity rise.  By 
contrast,  production  costs  tend  to  fall.    Globalization  and  its  two  main  drivers  – 
technological advance  and market liberalization  – tend to  have  a mixed  effect on 
transaction costs.  On the one hand, the advent of E-commerce is reducing the costs of 
cross  border  communication.    On  the  other,  the  increased  complexity  and 
                                                
15 Which we simply define as the creation of wealth which involves the use of scarce resources.  Under 
this definition, wealth can comprise any goods and services (including the reduction of ‘bads’) which 
gives satisfaction to those for whom it is intended.   11 
specialization of modern dynamic knowledge based economy demands new and more 
flexible  incentive  structures  and  enforcement  mechanisms  to  ensure  that  the 
transaction costs of the relevant markets and non-market instruments are kept to the 
minimum.  Such a reconfiguration of institutions, North asserts, is necessary at every 
level  of  decision  taking  (from  the  individual  to  supranational  entities)  if  the 
development goals articulated by Sen, and the transformation and local ownership of 
resources and capabilities and the integration of global or regional markets identified 
by Stiglitz, are to come to fruition. 
  In his more recent writings, North has attempted to advance our understanding 
about the origin of institutions and institutional change.  This takes us into the realm 
of values and belief systems, which, though we shall acknowledge in the next section 
of this paper, must await more detailed examination in another contribution. 
  Before turning to our own interpretation of the NDP, we should make brief 
mention  of  the  changing  attitudes  and  perspectives  of  the  practitioners  and 
constituents of the development process itself.  These – particularly enumerated by 
national governments and supranational agencies have undoubtedly influenced and 
been influenced by academic scholarship.  But more than anything else, I would argue 
here,  has  been  the  combined  effects  of  globalisation  itself  and  the  experience  of 
developing countries with the workings of the ODP. 
  As far as individuals – and to a certain extent civil society as a whole, it has 
been the ‘awareness’ factor of how the other half lives’ coupled with an increased 
appreciation of all aspects of freedom, the imperatives of environmental protection, a 
greater sense of social justice, and the extent of dire poverty which have prompted a 
reappraisal  of  their  own  and  internal  incentive  structures  in  pressurising  both   12 
corporations and governments to encourage a more socially responsible and inclusive 
form of development.
16 
  “Corporations too, though still fairly focused on the traditional objectives of 
their  value  added  activities,  are  increasingly  cognisant  of  their  wider  social 
responsibilities.    The  environment,  an  acceptable  minimum  standard  of  working 
conditions, more accountability and transparency of their financial et al operation, and 
the critical importance of trust and other forms of relationship capital reciprocity for 
successful partnering, a judicious and responsible application of monopoly power and 
the  absence  of  corporate  malfeasance,  are  all  avenues  which  are  requiring  new 
institutional structures either of a ‘top down’ regulatory or a ‘bottom up’ voluntary 
nature demanded by the NDP. 
  No less have national governments and supranational entities changed their 
perceptions  of  development.    In  the  1980s and  early  1990s  most  governments  of 
developing countries, backed by their counterparts in the OECD countries, placed 
upgrading national competitiveness as top of their political agendas.  This was in 
marked contrast to the earlier decade in which the goals of the same administrations 
had been much influenced by such UN initiatives as the New International Order.  In 
the last decade there has been some reaction to the less welcome consequences of 
liberalized markets (including free cross border capital markets), and an increasing 
integration of their economies into global markets, including that fostered by MNEs.  
More particularly in the 2000s, partly as a result of the publicity of unacceptable 
business  practices,  renewed  attention  is  now  being  given  to  both  ‘top  down’  and 
‘bottom up’ ways of ensuring that MNEs and their affiliates conduct themselves in a 
                                                
16 For example, by the action they take in the market place, by ethical investment initiatives, and 
through the ballot box.   13 
way consistent with the goals and values of the NDP – as perceived appropriate by the 
particular countries in question.
17 
  Of the supranational agencies, perhaps the World Bank, over the last decade or 
so, has widened its agenda on development orthodoxies to incorporate those elements 
identified by the Nobel Laureates.  Indeed a study of the annual World Development 
Reports (WDRs) suggests there has been a regular interchange of views, opinions, and 
recommended  action  between  the  Bank,  its  various  consultants  and  academia  in 
general.
18 To give just three examples, first, in the 2000s much more attention is being 
given to the quality of the institutions in developing countries prior to the granting of 
any aid;  second there is an increasing – though in some cases a somewhat hesitant – 
recognition  that  a  local  ownership  of  the  ingredients  of  development  including 
technical and financial assistance provided by the Bank is a better guarantee of a 
sensible  usage  than  an  insistence  of  conditions  attached  to  such  assistance.    And 
thirdly, the Bank is now acknowledging that the role of non-market organisations – 
and  in  particular  the  State  and  civil  society  have  an  important  role  to  play  in 
determining  and  charting  the  course  of  development;    and  the  quality  of  their 
incentive structures is a critical component of this task. 
  We  do  not  have  the  space  to  review  the  perceptions  of  the  other  UN 
agencies.
19 But undoubtedly one of the foremost agencies to adopt a broader approach 
to the developmental impact of 20/21 globalization has been the International Labor 
Office, which in 2002 commissioned a group of experts to study and report on the 
                                                
17 Increasingly, I view the increasingly broad interpretation now being given, for example, by such UN 
agencies as the United Nations Research Centre on Social Development (UNRISD) to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) as a renaissance of the earlier emphasis on performance requirements. 
18 For more details see two excellent surveys of the themes and contents of the WDR between 1978 and 
2000/1, by Mawdsley and Rigg (2002 and 2003). 
19 This is the subject of a number of ongoing research projects due to be completed in this year or in 
2004.  See for example Tesnev (2000), Richter (2003) and Sagafi Negad (2004).   14 
social dimensions of globalization.
20  Finally, at the UN itself, mention should be 
made of the initiation in 1999 of a Global Compact by the secretary General and 
between large corporations, national governments and parts of civil society.  Such a 
compact is based upon three fundamental and widely agreed values, all of which have 
been agreed by the UN and its agencies, and further broken down into nine principles 
of corporate behavior – all of which seem to confirm the need for an NDP.
21 
  In Table 4, we set out a summary of the main contents of the NDP drawn from 
the sources already identified.  In the next section of the paper, we present our own 
framework of the paradigm before proceeding to discuss to what extent, and in what 
ways, it requires business scholars to reappraise their thinking about the determinants 
of MNE activity in developing countries. 
 
5  THE DUNNING MODEL (OF VERSION OF THE NDP) 
  In diagram 2 we set out our taxonomy of the components of the NDP in the 
form of a number of sequential steps or a kind of value-chain of inputs.  We start off 
in (1) by the identification of the objectives of development.  As already indicated 
these are likely to be multifaceted and context specific.  In addition, they need to be 
viewed  dynamically  (viz.  over  time)  with  the  process  by  which  development  is 
achieved being an end in itself. 
  In (2) we identify the determinants of the extent to which these objectives are 
likely to be met.  These will be first dependent on the resources (R) or (T), capabilities 
(C), and market opportunities (M) created, accessed or utilised by the main wealth 
creating organizations in society.  (See 2A).  These may be internally or externally 
                                                
20 The report is due to be published in February 2004. 
21 For a review of the current state of the Global Compact see UN 2003.  For a critical review of its 
provisions and impact on corporate social responsibility and development in general see Richter 
(2003).   15 
sourced.  Such (R) and (C) may comprise both national assets (land and unskilled 
labor) and created assets, management capabilities, knowledge, organizational skills, 
financial capital and entrepreneurship, depending on the characteristics of demand 
and  the  market  structure  (M)  may  be  natural  or  created  (via  better  information, 
advertising, product innovation, and so on). 
  For the most part, the ODP – or at least the economists’ contribution to our 
understanding about its determinants – stops at this point of the value chain, although, 
when  viewed  from  a  policy  perspective,  and  over  time,  the  incentive  structures 
underpinning the behavior of firms – particularly as they affect the creation of new 
(R) and (C) and/or markets – are given some attention.
22  However, by contrast, the 
NDP gives these issues pride of place – mainly as we have indicated because 20/21 
globalization,  recent  advances  in  technology,  new  scholarly  insights  into  the 
determinants of growth, have shown that however necessary (R), (C) and (M) may be 
for the competitiveness of firms and to the development of countries in themselves 
they may not be a sufficient condition.  For this to be so explicit, attention needs to be 
given to the quality and contents of institutions, and the mechanisms by which they 
are initiated and enforced. 
  In (2B) we then explicitly incorporate institutions as a variable which both 
influences the content and quality of (R), (C) and (M) and is influenced by them.  In 
this  paper  we  shall  adapt  the  Northian  interpretation  of  institutions  as  “incentive 
structures  which  determine  the  attitudes  and  behavior  of  individuals  and 
organizations  owning  or  accessing  (R),  (C)  and  (M),  and  the  ways  in  which  the 
latters’ creation and usage may best meet the objectives and content of development 
                                                
22 Mostly in the form of regulatory and incentive devices initiated by governments, including, for 
example, the conferring and protection of property rights, and    16 
goals” .
23  From the viewpoint of their individuals and organizations housing them, 
they represent the self imposed and/or enforced incentives and control mechanisms 
which  determine  their  attitudes  and  contacts  in  the  commercial  domain.  From  a 
societal viewpoint the totality of such institutions may be considered as the intangible 
component of its social capital (Fukuyama 2000).  As we have already indicated – 
and as indicated in Table 4, institutions and their enforcement mechanism may take 
various forms.  Their effectiveness is likely to be strongly context specific varying 
according  to  country,  as  well  as  to  the  characteristics  and  performance  of  the 
international economy.  In today’s 20/21 globalization their content and significance 
is also likely to be quite volatile;  particularly as it affects the response of individuals, 
firms, civil society and governments to economic and social change. 
  Institutions and institutional change may be demand or supply driven.  Recent 
events suggested each has interfaced with the other.  Institutions affecting change in 
demand include measures to improve information flows, advertising, taxation, peer 
pressure  and  the  tastes,  buying  habits  and  expectations  of  consumers.    Those 
influencing the supply of goods and services include laws and regulatory property 
right protection, tax incentives, attitudes towards corporate responsibility, the ethical 
or moral ethos of society – its constituent organizations – including governments – 
towards the wealth creating process, competition (or the absence of same) and the 
stage or pace of development. 
  In the ODP the performance of a country’s institutions is primarily evaluated 
by the efficiency with which markets operate – be they intermediate or final product 
labor markets – and the role of governments in facilitating this process.  In the NDP, 
institutions  play  a  critical  role  in  determining  the  ethos  and  governance  of  the 
                                                
23 We accept of course there are other interpretations of institutions.  For a recent review of these see 
Williamson (2000) or Maitland and Nicholas (2003).   17 
organizations  responsible  for  resource  creation  and  utilization;    these  same 
organizations (and the individual decision takers within them) react to and implement 
change and the effectiveness of alternative models of governance (e.g. hierarchies cf 
joint ventures and strategic alliances).  In the NDP, the nature of the interface between 
‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’  institutional constraints – as may influence the quality of 
entrepreneurship  and  human  resource  development,  the  extent  and  pattern  of 
innovation, the ethical imperatives  underpinning interfirm alliances, the  system of 
property  rights,  the  content  and  effectiveness  of  corporate  social  responsibility,
24 
together with the mechanisms by which these structures once introduced fulfil their 
purpose – is…………………. 
  Another feature of the NDP is that it accepts that there is no ‘one size fits all’ 
optimum developmental strategy.  Inter alia this acknowledgement has been brought 
about by the forces of globalization and technical change.  In turn this has led to the 
awareness  that  not  only  do  the  values  and  goals  of  develop……………….differ 
across  countries,  according  to  their  inherited  cultures  and  ideologies,  but  that  the 
nature  and  content  of  the  institutions  and  institutional  infrastructure  required  to 
promote the best use of their (R), (C) and (M) may itself influence these cultures and 
ideologies.
25  Indeed, as has been pointed out elsewhere (Dunning 2003), the success 
of responsible global capitalism rests on the willingness and ability of its constituents 
to create a set of institutions and institutional constraints which will ensure that the 
gains  from  the  integration  of  cross  border  markets  and  production  systems  are 
                                                
24 As judged appropriate by the stakeholders of the corporations and society to best meet their 
respective (developmental) goals. 
25 Indeed there are as many different values placed upon the kind of institutions underpinning the 
wealth creation process as a country’s (R), (C) and (M) – however highly productive these may be – 
that give rise to the different roles played by the market, governments, civil society in that process 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001).   18 
balanced against those arising from decentralization of decision taking about the use 
of (R), (C) and (M)s specific to, and embedded in, local communities. 
  But  should  the  interest  and  the  contribution  of  economists  and  business 
scholars go further to ask what, in turn, determines a societies’ behavioural norms and 
other institutional constraints.  Douglass North believes so and is now working in the 
area of values and belief systems which he believes connects ‘reality to institutions 
(North 1999).  In this paper we will do more than to acknowledge three things.  First 
the fact that the institutions of society and its constituent decision taking organizations 
does  rest  on  the  values,  and  their  origin  of  different  cultures  and  belief  systems.  
Second that the age of 20/21 globalization is bringing about a reconfiguration of the 
core values underpinning behavioural mores – inter alia because of (a) a new set of 
consumer-based freedoms and expectations associated with liberalised markets and 
technological  advances,  and  (b)  a  heightened  sense  of  awareness  of  some  of  the 
injustices and exclusivities of the wealth creating and distributing system.  Third that 
for  the  most  part,  the  prioritisation  of  the  values  just  described  differ  very 
considerably across different cultures. 
  In a recently edited book (Dunning 2003), a number of contributors explored 
some  of  the  virtues  which  they  believed  help  socially  fuel  responsible  and 
democratically inclusive global capitalism.  A few of these, they argued, needed to be 
universally  held  and  practised  by  all  of those participating  in  the  wealth  creating 
process.  Others, however, were specific to particular belief systems.  Some were 
based on religious belief, tradition and interested family values, others reflected the 
spirit of the age, advertising the need for reputation, the influence of governments’ 
moral suasion, and peer pressure.,  Each to some extent or other helped and helps 
fashion the institutions and institutional constraints underpinning economic and social   19 
activity.    The  content  and  character  of  each  and  the  extent  to  which  they  are 
harmonized or the differences respected and tolerated in the institutional framework 
governing global commercial transactions is both one of the key components of the 
NDP, and one of the determinants of the success of future development strategies. 
  In the following section we shall turn to consider the impact of some of the 
NDP  attributes  of  the  determinants  of  IB  activity.    In  doing  so  we  propose  to 
concentrate  on  the  way  in  which  the  explicit  addition  of  institutions  into  the 
traditional explanations of such activity may affect (and have affected) our thinking.  
However, in doing so we shall not stray further down the chain of determinants, i.e. 
beyond (2b) of development set out in Diagram 2.  This indeed is the subject for 
another paper (or group of papers!). 
 
6.  THE  DETERMINANTS  OF  IB  ACTIVITY:    REVISING  AND 
  EXTENDING THE OLI PARADIGM 
 
  In what ways then has the reconfiguration of the purposes of development, and 
the means by which these purposes might be achieved affected our understanding of 
the determinants of the competitive or ownership (O) advantages of firms;  the value 
adding attractions of alternative locations (i.e. L advantages);  and the extent to which 
firms choose to exploit or add to their O advantages by internalising the market for 
them (I advantages), by doing this jointly with, or selling them or their rights to, other 
firms. 
  We shall suggest in the following paragraphs that such a reconfiguration is 
desirable.    At  the  same  time  we  shall  suggest  that  explicit  incorporation  of  the 
institutions into received theory does pose a number of challenges.  Some are to do 
with their nature, as compared with other (more tangible or easily measurable) forms 
of the advantages of firms or countries.  Some relate to the extent of their cross-border   20 
mobility;    some  to  the  closer  interface  of  their  origin,  form  and  implementation, 
between firms and countries;  some to the dynamics of institutional change compared 
with that of (R), (C) and (M);  and some to the difficulty of separating the value of 
institutions as from that of the (R), (C) and (Ms) in where they are incorporated. 
  Following  our  previous  writings  we  consider  the  role  of  institutions  in  IB 
activity by incorporating them into the OLI paradigm;  and we shall consider each of 
these three elements of the paradigm in turn.  We shall then take a more dynamic look 
at the paradigm  to see if the institutional related interface between firms and  the 
location of their value added activities in developing countries strongly influences and 
is influenced by the transformation process of those countries as earlier identified by 
our three Nobel Laureates 
5.1  Ownership specific (O) advantages 
  In addition to the Oa and Ot
26
 specific advantages of an MNE, or potential 
MNE,  identified  by  the  eclectic  paradigm,  we  are  now  adding  a  third  –  viz 
institutional  ownership  specific  advantages  (Oi).    Such  advantages  comprise  the 
institutional structures of an MNE, which underpin, influence and are influenced by 
the (R), (C) and (M) owned or access by it.  Such an institutional structure consists of 
a  galaxy  of  both  internally  and  externally  imposed  incentives  and  regulations, 
affecting all areas of the decision process of the firm, and the attitudes and behavior of 
its workers, and how it relates to other economic and political actors in the wealth 
creating process.
27  Such incentives may be formal or informal (in the Northian sense) 
and backed up by the firm’s own enforcement mechanisms. 
                                                
26. Oa refers to the advantages arising from particular assets (e.g. the stock of (R), (C) and (M) where Ot 
embraces the ability of the firm to coordinate these assets (or their usage) both at home and abroad, 
both within the firm and with those of other firms effectively). 
27So called ‘relational’ capital of the firm as examined in Dunning (2002b) and Dyer and Singh (1998) 
and Kale, Singh and Perlmutter (2002).    21 
  By  the  specific  incorporation  of  Oi  into  the  eclectic  paradigm  –  and 
particularly when considering it as part of the response of firms to the NDP, - we are 
acknowledging (what we believe to be) the increasingly important attribute of the 
income generating assets of firms.  As with the resource based theory of the firm, for 
Oi to yield a net competitive advantage (cf the Oi of rival firms), it must be unique, (to 
some extent at least)  non imitatable and sustainable.  At the time we recognise that it 
is the totality of the O specific advantages of firms (i.e. Oa and Ot which confers upon 
the firm the necessary assets to allow it to engage in fdi, or increase its foreign value 
added activities. 
  While  we  would  accept  that  the  ingredients  of  Oi  have  long  been 
acknowledged, we believe that 20/21 globalization and related technological changes 
are compelling  scholars  to  more carefully  evaluate  their contribution  to  the  value 
added process, both relative to other forms of O specific assets and to what extent, for 
example, are such institutional changes such as upgrading the level 4 corporate social 
responsibility  or a  revision  of the patent laws, or  a reconfiguration  of managerial 
compensation,  or  a  new  form  of  contract  with  a  partner  firm  to  speed  up  the 
innovation  processing,  or  a  new  enforcement  mechanism  to  reduce  opportunistic 
behavior,  or  judicious  lobbying  with  governments  and/or  alliances  with  NGO  to 
achieve a more environmentally friendly strategy cost effective competitive tools?  To 
what extent are the particular forms of the incentive structure to achieve a particular 
behavioural goal effective cf other forms.  These are questions – and many others like 
them – which we can only ask in this paper.  But we are suggesting that, to better 
understand the current determinants and effectiveness of MNE activity in developing 
countries pursuing policies and strategies consistent with the NDP, these questions do 
need to engage the more serious attention of IB scholars.   22 
  The composition and strength of Oi advantages of firms is likely to be strongly 
contextual.  In particular, it is likely to reflect the character of the macro-institutional 
infrastructure of the country or countries in which they operate.  The extent and ways 
in  which  the  incentive  structure  of  MNEs,  or  potential  MNEs,  of  a  particular 
nationality  take  on  board  these  institutions  and  adapt  them  to  their  particular 
circumstances is likely to be an important ingredient of the quality of unique and 
sustainable resources and capabilities.  On the one hand, for example, an ethnocentric 
approach  to  the  institutional  management  of  subsidiaries  in  a  very  different 
institutional  culture  is  less  likely  to  generate  the  kind  of  Oi  advantages,  than  a 
geocentric approach which externalises that part of the distinctive incentive structures 
of its global portfolio most useful for organising the (R), (C) and (M) in the particular 
country(ies) in which it operates.
28                                                                                                                                                                                   
  The institutional portfolio of MNEs is also likely to  vary according to the 
value activities carried out by them and their affiliates and the raison d’etre for these 
activities.  Thus the ‘rules of the game’ and enforcement mechanisms to stimulate cost 
effective innovatory activities – particularly where these are undertaken with a partner 
–  are  likely  to  be  very  different  from  those  which  underpin  the  conduct  of  the 
personnel managers of affiliates to human resource management of that ensuring the 
employment  practices  and  safety  procedures  of  subcontractors  to  that of  ensuring 
proper quality control procedures of their local distributors. 
  With respect to the motives for MNE activity, it seems likely that some kinds 
of strategic asset seeking fdi is designed not only to gain access to foreign (R), (C) 
and (Ms) but to the firm or country specific institutions.  Particularly this is likely to 
be the case where the culture of doing business in the home and host countries is 
                                                
28 This idea extends the thoughts of Doz, Santos and Williamson in respect of the kind of O advantages 
derived by being a meta-multinational (Doz, Santos and Williamson (2001)).   23 
markedly different.  Adaptations to the home based Oi assets of market seeking MNEs 
– and particularly of those with the least experience of foreign markets
29 may also be 
required to take account of differences in customer behavior;  while the incentive 
structure  underpinning  efficiency  seeking  fdi  –  particularly  in  C  and  between 
developing  low labor cost  countries may need modifying because  of the different 
expectations,  requirements  and  values  of  individual  workers  and/or  labor  unions.  
Lastly, the reconciliation of comparative institutional differences are likely to play a 
less significant role in the case of natural resource or capital intensive MNEs which 
invoke relatively few transactions. 
  What finally of the origin of Oi specific assets of firms?
30  How can they be 
optimised?  Well, in some cases, such assets (which in principle could be of negative 
value) might be imposed by governments or supranational entities.  Examples include 
patent protection, banking regulations, transparency in laws relating to bribery and 
corruption, and safety procedures 
5.2  The advantages of countries 
  A review of the literature of the 1970s and 1980s on the attractiveness of 
particular locations
31 which normally comprise countries or regions within countries, 
to both domestic and foreign corporations suggests that most emphasis was placed on 
(a) the costs and quality of particular factor endowments ((R) and (C), (b) the size, 
character and growth of markets (Ms) and (c) the policies of government, e.g. taxes 
and  fiscal  incentives  which  might  affect  (a)  and  (b).    In  part  (c)  contained 
                                                
29 Notably some first time small and medium sized foreign investors. 
30 i.e. of firms of one nationality of ownership cf another. 
31 As summarized for example in Dunning (1993).   24 
institutionally  related  variables  yet  these  were  rarely  spelled  out  or  treated 
holistically.
32 
  Since the advent of globalization – and particularly as a result of the transition 
of several Central and Eastern European economies and the Chinese economies from 
Communism to market based economy much more attention has been paid to the 
quality of institutional structure of countries.  Table 5 presents a taxonomy we used in 
a  recent  paper  (Dunning  2003b)  which  is  an  adaptation  of  a  chart  which  was 
originally published in UN (1998). 
  The general proposition which this taxonomy throws up is that the more these 
conditions favor a particular location, the more MNEs will choose to create or add 
value to their O specific advantages in that country.  Reclassifying and/or extending 
the variables to more explicitly incorporate institutions then the implication is that the 
higher the quality (and cost effectiveness) of institutions (as they affect the (R), (C) 
and (M) of MNEs or potential MNEs, the more likely they will have the ability and 
motivation to engage in fdi. 
  Let us now consider the reconfiguration of L advantages demanded by the 
NDP.  This, as Section 3 of this paper has shown, differs in a number of important 
respects from the ODP both in respect of the objectives of development and means of 
achieving these objectives.  Once these characteristics have been identified, the next 
task of national governments is to ensure that the incentive structure of society and its 
constituent wealth creating entities are able to create, organize effectively and utilise 
the (R), (C) and (M) as demanded by them.  To take advantage of being part of a 
global economy this also embraces the provision of the specific institutions necessary 
to encourage the import by way of fdi or (R), (C) and (M) of foreign firms, which 
                                                
32 An exception includes some of the reports of the United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC) See e.g. UN (1978, 1983).   25 
when  jointly  used  with  those  of  indigenous  firms  might  create  a  value  added 
consistent with the country’s comparative dynamic advantage.  But to do this the 
recipient country must offer the incentive structure(s) which the foreign firms need if 
they are tempted to engage in that kind of production – and to do so in an effective 
and timely manner.   
  Such location bound institutions (Li) stretch along a huge range .  At the one 
end foreign markets may be influenced by the investment promotion policies of host 
governments  and  by  the  content  of  bilateral  investment  agreements  which  they 
conclude  with  foreign  firms.    At  the  other,  there  are  a  host  of  policy  options, 
regulations  and incentives  directed  to  influencing  the  entry,  performance  and exit 
conditions imposed on foreign investors. 
  The institutional profile of a country’s organizations, particularly as it affects 
fdi, is strongly contextual.  It has, for example, undergone quite significant shifts over 
the past four decades as governments’ attitudes towards the costs and benefits of fdi 
have fluctuated.  But we believe that 20/21 globalization and the NDP is demanding 
the most radical scrutiny of all of its incentive structures.  This is because of the 
increasing connectivity of economic transactions and the social goals of economic 
progress  which  are  creating  challenges  to  the  working  together  of  very  different 
institutions which have previously been kept separate from each other. 
  At  all  levels  of  national  economic  and  social  life,  established  institutions 
underpinning behavioural patterns are being questioned.  Sometimes these relate to 
the  business  practices  of  firms;    sometimes  of  governments;    sometimes  of  non 
governmental  organisations  (NGOs)  or  special  interest  groups,  e.g.  churches  and 
philanthropic  organizations;    sometimes  of  supranational  agencies.    Part  of  the 
questioning relates to that of long held and respected belief systems or traditional   26 
globalization which is compelling a re-examination of the moral ecology of different 
economies not least because its form and content is becoming an L advantage (or 
disadvantage) in its own right. 
  Like  the  Oi  of  firms,  the  Li  (and  changes  in  Li)  are  likely  to  be  higher 
contextual.    In  our  present  context  we  would  hypothesise  they  would  differ  very 
considerably  both  between  developed  and  developing  countries  and  between 
developing countries.  As an example of the latter, over most of the 1970s, 1980s and 
early 1990s the incentive structures of most East Asian countries were much more 
conducive to promoting the creation and usage of their (R), (C) and (Ms), and to 
meeting their developmental goals than those of most Latin American and virtually all 
sub-Saharan African countries.  Without a reconfiguration of the institutions of China, 
the impressive growth path experienced over the last decade and more would not have 
been possible.  Institutional “inadequacy and mismanagement” both on the part of the 
organisations (including governments) of several East Asian economies and that of 
the leading organizations of the richer industrialized countries (including the World 
Bank and the IMF) explained much of the crisis in the former economies in the mid-
1980s. 
  Finally, the balance between ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ incentive structures – 
that between obligatory and voluntary enforcement mechanisms - is likely to be a 
strongly  culture  specific  L  variable;    and  as  we  have  already  indicated,  without 
sensitivity and understanding on the part of MNEs, may well  add to the ‘psychic’ 
between home and host countries.
33 
  There are many other country specific characteristics determining the content 
of L which we do not have space to deal with in detail.  These include the openness of 
                                                
33 This could have interesting implications not only in respect of the location of fdi, but whether a firm 
should eschew fdi for exports.  The theory here which dates back to Hirsch (1976) is that if the costs of 
reconciling different incentive……………………   27 
a country and the extent to which it is engaged in cross-border commerce involving 
different………………(cf.  Singapore  with  Ghana);    the  extent  to  which  it  is 
multicultural and tolerant of different belief systems (cf Malaysia with Iran), its stage 
of  development  (which  may  affect  the  quality  of  its  supportive  institutional 
infrastructure (cf Pakistan with Korea);  the institutional demands of its particular 
industrial structure (cf Saudi Arabia with Hong Kong);  its size (cf Sri Lanka with 
Indonesia);  its culture towards wealth creation and entrepreneurship (cf Taiwan with 
………………….;  the extent of social unrest or upheaval (cf Colombia with Chile);  
and perhaps most important of all, the extent of democracy and freedom of action by 
the main wealth creators in society (cf. Vietnam and Cambodia).  In 2003 cf with that 
of 1980s, or cf Zimbabwe with Botswana). 
  If nothing else, these few examples show both (a) how important is the Li 
component to a country’s locational attractions;  (b) how complex the composition 
and quality of its various components and (c) how much these vary so much between 
countries – and, for the most part, for very different reasons. 
  In  summary,  the  goals  and  contents  of  the  NDP  and  the  impact  of  20/21 
globalization are the suggestion that L-based institutional advantages should be at the 
heart of the determinants of IB activity.  If North (1999) is right in averring that 
institutional differences in the incentive structures between countries are a critical 
explanation of their differential growth rates and development paths, and that such 
growth and patterns of development are an important determinant of fdi, it follows 
that the extent, form and quality of a country’s institutional infrastructure, and its 
upgrading (as it affects each and every individual and organization involved in the 
wealth creating process) is likely to impact on MNE activity.  There is already much   28 
evidence that this has been so in the case of the transition economies,.
34  There is 
urgent  need  for  more  empirical  work  on  the  role  of  institutional  upgrading  in 
promoting both domestic and inbound foreign investment.
35 
5.3  The I advantages of firms. 
  Lastly what of the implications of the 20/21 globalization and the NDP for the 
modality  by  which  MNEs,  or  potential  MNEs,  acquire,  gain  access  to  or  exploit 
competitive specific advantages (and particularly their Oi assets in foreign countries?  
What are the relative costs and benefits of internalising (the market) for creation or 
use of these assets or the right to their use?  To what extent, in fact, is it possible to 
license or otherwise contrast out their creation or use. 
  In explaining the organizational choice of deployment of the Oa and Ot assets 
of a firm in a foreign location, scholars have turned to transaction cost theory.  In the 
case of Oa the choice between adding value  to particular  proprietary right (e.g. a 
patent) by way of a wholly owned affiliate rather than (say) a non-equity licensing or 
franchising  arrangement  rests  on  the  balance  between  such  benefits  as  arresting 
opportunism, moral hazard and loss of quality control, of relaxing ownership to those 
of  less  capital  investment  (and  the  risk attached  to  this)  and  the access  to  added 
knowledge which a contractual agreement might offer.  In the case of Ot, almost by 
definition, there is no market for such assets apart from their use with Oa;  therefore 
they have to be internalised.
36 
  What of the use made of Oi?  We can illustrate by considering two scenarios.  
The first is where the incentive structure of both firms and society to the creation and 
                                                
34 See particularly Bevan, Estrin and Meyer (2004), and Holland, Sass, Benacck and Groncki (2000) 
and Meyer (2002). 
35 The World Bank is, in fact, currently undertaking some major research into this very question.  
However, in this and other research there is a very real problem in operationalising different incentive 
structures cf with the organisations or social capital housing such structures. 
36 These characteristics are explored in several others of my writings.  See especially Dunning 2002a, 
2002b.   29 
use of (R), (C) and (Ms) in the investing and recipient countries is fundamentally the 
same (e.g. as between the US and Canada).  Then only to the extent to which there are 
Oi advantages of the investing firm additional to those of the (possible partner) firms 
in the host country, would the question of the appropriate governance of the cross 
border transfer of the assets (or their rights) arise.  However, in so far as Oi have to be 
deployed with the Oa or Ot specific to the MNEs then they like Ot have to be under the 
ownership of the same firms. 
  However, the particularly interesting feature of globalization and the NDP is 
that  institutions  are  likely  to  differ  significantly  between  investing  and  recipient 
countries.    This  applies  no  less  for  South/North  and  South/South  fdi  as  for 
North/South  fdi.    Because  of  this,  the  relative  merits  of  alternative  trans-border 
organizational forms are likely to change.  At the one extreme (e.g. in some kinds of 
asset seeking fdi) the incentive structures of the investing company may be totally 
inappropriate for it to impose on its subsidiary.  The choice is either to adapt the 
incentive structure or engage in joint venture or contractual agreement with a local 
firm, so that the (other) O advantage transferred and combined with the (R), (C) and 
(Ms) of the partner firm may be effectively deployed.  In such cases, which might be 
quite common between countries with very different business cultures and/or belief 
systems (e.g. China and the US) or at different stages of development (e.g. Australia 
and Vietnam). 
  At the same time if the incentive structures of the investing firm reflect those 
which are likely to be eventually embraced by the host countries (as now seems to be 
happening in the case of UK and German fdi in the Baltic States and in Croatia and 
Slovenia),  then  Oi advantages at least in the initial stages of fdi in an unfamiliar 
country are most likely to be internalised.   30 
  However, as with the form of any foreign involvement, much will depend 
on the host government’s policy towards the foreign ownership of assets.  On the one 
hand  liberlization  of  markets  in  the  1990s  and  the  need    perceived  by  many 
developing countries for them to be integrated into the global economy via efficiency 
seeking fdi, is leading to a harmonisation of intra firm incentive structures.  On the 
other,  the  increasing  attention  now  being  paid  to  all  aspects  of  corporate  social 
responsibility  has  encouraged  some  developing  countries  to  renew  their  earlier 
attention to ensure that the performance behaviour of foreign affiliates promotes their 
economic and social objectives;  this includes abiding by their own institutions, and 
the values and belief systems underpinning them.  The response of many MNEs is to 
prefer to conclude non-equity business relationships (e.g. in the sub-contracting of the 
early  stage  manufacturing  process  in  the  electronics  and  textile  industries  and  in 
transference of call centres from developed………………. 
  As  with  Oi  and  Li  advantages,  the  character  and  significance  of  those 
concerned with the vehicle of exploiting or augmenting the accumulated institutional 
assets of the investing company
37 is likely to be activity specific.  In the case of those 
involving culture sensitive production  processes or outputs, or first time investors 
seeking  to  supply  markets  in  unfamiliar  countries,  one  might  predict  that 
institutionally related transaction costs would be lower if it concluded a partnership 
with a local firm rather than pursue a go it alone mode of operation.  However, global 
firms with (successful) subsidiaries in countries with similar incentive structures and 
those in which they have only a marginal impact on the creation and use of  (R), (C) 
and (M) might well prefer 100 per cent ownership of their foreign assets – providing 
that this was the modality in accord with their other assets. 
                                                
37 Both from its home based and foreign based operations.   31 
  Exogenous to their value added activities the last two decades has seen an 
increasing influence on the modes of institutional governance of MNEs by other extra 
organizational market entities, viz NGOs, national governments and supranational 
agencies.  These are generally fostering a multi-faceted and cooperative approach to 
institutional upgrading, though some of the recent practices of both NGOs and some 
national governments would belie this.  But at a supranational level there are several 
serious, albeit halting and not always wise, attempts to try and get the various wealth 
creating organizations throughout the world – and those which influence the behavior 
of these organizations by the rules of the game enforcement, to accept a series of 
common or universal institutions.  Such for example is the Global Compact of the UN 
to which we have already referred (UN 2003).  Others include the OECD Guidelines 
to Multinational Agencies and a bevy of bilateral investment agreements. 
  Each  of  these  affects  not  only  the  level  and  pattern  of  MNE  activity  in 
developing  countries,  but  also  the  modality  of  operation.    And  it  does  this  by 
harmonizing and for the most part lowering the transaction costs of the institutions 
underpinning the business transactions throughout the world.  Sometimes along with 
advances in communication e.g. the internet, this makes for more fdi;  in others, by 
lowering  the  transaction  costs  or  market  exchanges  it  encourages  MNEs  to 
disinternalize their foreign value activities and engage in more subcontracting and 
other non-equity ventures. 
  The  last  decade  has  been  a  period  of  intense  cross-border  merger  and 
acquisition activity.  While this has involved firms in the developed world since 1998, 
the rate of increase of purchases of corporations in developing countries has outpaced 
that in the rest of the world.  We would suggest that part of the reason for this may 
well be not only to buy into the institutional assets of the acquired company, but also,   32 
and particularly if the buyer is contemplating expansion or restructuring the product 
or  process  portfolio  in  the  host  country  as  a  result  of  the  acquisition,  to  better 
appreciate the incentive structure of other organizations (including the government). 
  In  short,  I  would  foresee  no  real  difficulty  in  applying  the  received 
internalisation theory to explaining the mode of creating and using Oi  assets of an 
MNE  or  potential  MNE  in  a  particular  host  country.    There  is  a  proviso  to  this 
endorsement.  That is that such theory is widened to include issues relating to the 
process of development and embraces not just transactions involving the purchase or 
sale of products, but to the governance of innovating and production activities as well.  
For we believe nowhere is the significance of incentive structures – or should we say 
the right incentive structures – more important in influencing the behavior of firms in 
the creation and use of (R), (C) and (M). 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
  The  readers  of  this  paper  will  quickly  realize  that  I  have  put  together  a 
kaleidoscope of ideas and implicit propositions about both the NDP and how it affects 
the determinants of IB activity.  Apart from the isolated reference and casual …….I 
have made no attempt to test some of the concepts and views put forward, nor indeed 
formulate formal hypotheses.  That has not been the objective of the paper. 
  Rather have I concentrated on what I believe to be a topic which though by no 
means ignored in the development and IB literature, has not been given the attention it 
warranted.    I  believe  that  20/21  globalization  and  the  emerging  approach  to 
understanding the goals and challenges of development is forcing business scholars to 
give institutions (a la Douglass North) a center stage treatment.  It is also requiring 
that incentive structures be integrated more explicitly into the mainstream paradigms   33 
and theories of IB activity as for example recommended by Wainright and Nicholas 
(2003).  A hint of the way this can be done is set out in Table 6. 
  In  this  paper  I  have  outlined  the  kind  of  additional  institutionally  related 
elements  which  need  to  be  incorporated  in  our  eclectic  paradigm  of  international 
production  and  to  the  more  specific  economic  and  business  theories  it  embraces 
(Dunning 2000);  and also how these may affect the level, pattern of fdi and MNE 
activity.  We have suggested, for example, that globalization and the NDP is causing 
Oi to become a more important component both of the competitive advantages of 
firms and the locational attractions of countries.  How much this is the case and what 
forms of incentive structure are likely to be most conducive to upgrading quantity and 
quality of its (R), (C) and (M) of firms and countries, is however, likely to be strongly 
contextual.  For example in some cases the Oi advantages of firms of one nationality 
can be comfortably transferred to that of another country.  In other cases cross country 
cultural  and  ideological  differences  may  demand  that  MNEs  or  potential  MNEs 
should  engage  in  foreign  production  only  by  means  of  a  joint  venture  or  on  a 
contractual basis.  More generally our reasoning suggests that the modality by which 
firms augment or create their O specific advantages outside their home countries is 
increasingly  influenced  by  the  extent  to  which  they  can  tap  into  and/or  integrate 
different incentive structures across the globe.  In this respect 20/21 globalization and 
the NDP adds a new dimension to the opportunities and challenges facing MNEs, 
governments  and  supranational  national  entities  of  balancing  the  advantages  of 
globalization  and  the  harmonization  or  coordination  of  institutions  with  those  of 
retaining  the  ‘dignity  of  difference’  of  the  economic,  political  and  cultural 
composition of national or regional institutions.   34 
  In clarifying and suggesting responses to these opportunities and challenges, I 
believe the IB scholar has a critical contribution to make. 
 
    Reading and Rutgers Universities 
    February 2004   35 
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(Institutions)   42 
TABLE 1 
THE OLD DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM (NEO-CLASSICAL MODEL) 
     





·  MAINLY ECONOMIC (GNP 
PER CAPITA) 
  ·  LITTLE ATTENTION 




·  LITTLE ATTENTION 
GIVEN TO PUBLIC GOODS 















·  MEANS/E.G.WORKING 
CONDITIONS) NOT PART 
OF ENDS 
  ·  CULTURAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
LARGELY IGNORED.  
DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES ASSUMED 





·  DEVELOPMENT 
PRIORITIES 
 
·  GROWTH IN GNP PER 
CAPITA 
 
·  LIMITED PAID TO ISSUES 
OF SOVEREIGNTY, 
OWNERSHIP, EQUITY 









     
     
     
     
MAIN STAKEHOLDERS/PLAYERS 
·  MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
·  SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM 
·  LIMITED ROLE OF EXTRA-
MARKET ACTORS 
MEANS  ENDS   43 
TABLE 2 
SOME KEY FEATURES OF 020/21 GLOBALIZATION 
 
·  MARKET LIBERALIZATION 
  (a)  As affecting transition economies (and (some) developing  
    economies 
  (b)  As affecting all economies 
·  TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES 
  (a)  Transport and communications (leading to increased speed, lower 
    cost,  improved quality) 
  (b)  Other 
 
·  RELATIVE GROWTH OF ALLIANCE CAPITALISM AND 
NETWORK RELATIONSHIPS 
 
  (a)  Intra firm 
  (b)  Inter-firm 
  (c)  Inter-organization (e.g. between governments, NGOs and firms, 
    etc.) 
 
·  EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF NEW PLAYERS ON WORLD 
ECONOMIC SCENES (especially China and India).   44 




Sen  Stiglitz  North 
 




Increasing importance of 
institutions  









Wider concept of goals 
(over and above GNP per 
capita)  
 
Emphasis on ownership 
and participation 
Incentive structures and 
enforcement mechanisms 
Development as widening 
opportunities 
Inclusivity and consensus 
building 
 
Values, perceptions of 
reality, and beliefs 
Different aspects of 
freedom 
 





Social capital  Control over decision 
taking 
Culture/human rights  Accumulated learning 
and experience 
 
Extension of transaction 
costs to political markets 
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TABLE 4  
NEW DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM (NPD) 
 
 
ENDS  MEANS 
·  Development as 
freedom (affecting 
nature and substance 
of objectives) 
·  Transformation of 
society 
·  Holistic and integrated 
approach to human 
development 
·  Economic restructuring 
as a means to promote 
human development 
·  Beyond GNP per head 
·  Social Indices 
·  New development 
priorities 
￿  Relief of Poverty 
￿  Women’s rights 
￿  Health care 
￿  Quality of life 
￿  Education 
￿  The Environment 
·  Resources (R) 
capabilities (C) 
including ideas and 
entrepreneurship 
(including entrepreneurship) 














·  MARKETS, GOVERNMENTS, CIVIL 
SOCIETY, SUPRANATIONAL ENTITIES 
·  MORE PARTICIPATION AND LOCAL 
OWNERSHIP   46 
FIGURE 2 
 
THE DUNNING MODEL 
 
·  STAGE 1     IDENTIFYING THE CONTENT OF THE NDP 
 
·  STAGE 2    ·  STAGE 3 
 
THE VALUE CHAIN OF THE 
DETERMINANTS OF 20/21 
DEVELOPMENT 
(Moving backwards) though each 
interacts with the other 
 
  DETERMINANTS OF IBA AS 
INFLUENCED BY NDP 
 
2(A) (R) + (C) + (M) 
  3(A)  Ownership (0a, 0t, 0i) 
Advantages of Firms  
 
 
2(B) Institutions/Incentive Structures 
        Enforcement Mechanisms 
        Institutional Infrastructure 
   
3(B)  Location Advantages (L) 
including (Li) of Regions/Countries 
 
 
2(C)  Values/Virtues 
   
3(C)  Internalisation (I) (including Ii) 
Advantages of Linking 3A to 3B. 
 
2(D)  Belief Systems 
 
   
2(E)  Origins of Belief Systems     
 
2(F)  Triggers to Change 
 




BOTH STAGE 2 AND 3 OF THE MODEL CAN BE 
CONSIDERED FROM A STATIC OR A DYNAMIC 
(PROCESS) VIEWPOINT.  FOR EXAMPLE, IN STAGE 2 A 
CHANGE IN 2® ® ® ®2BF IN TIME t+1 MAY AFFECT 2A IN 
TIME T+1;  WHILE IN STAGE 3 (B) A CHANGE IN Li IN 
TIME t MAY AFFECT Oi IN TIME t + 1, AND IN STAGE 
3(C), A CHANGE IN Ii IN TIME t MIGHT AFFECT 0a IN 
TIME t + 1. 
 
NB.  Oi Li and Ii are defined in the text of paper. 